

Notes on the *Oresteia*

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Increasingly, we live in a world where nothing makes any sense. Events come and go like waves of a fever, leaving us confused and uncertain.

Adam Curtis in *Bitter Lake* (2015)¹

It is necessary to start from the real, otherwise you will never get to it.

François Laruelle, in conversation with Jacques Derrida (1988)²

In a nutshell, the story goes like this: post-war Europe had embraced a worldview with a logic of inclusion, and with resolute measures to involve the poor and the marginalised in the political and economic mainstream. In the past fifty years or so we have witnessed the steady, seemingly irreversible decline of this vision of the just society, as a result of the overt merging of neoliberal capitalism with the democratic order. In the political nations and unions with highly developed economies, “the economy” is being reconceptualised today – politically motivated as inherent to ‘modernisation of the welfare state’ – as a shrunken space with relatively fewer participants: fewer (small) companies, fewer workers and fewer consuming households. Western governments, central banks, the IMF, and similar international institutions now talk only of an ever more urgent and necessary reduction in government debt, in programmes for social welfare and in economic regulation.³ As Saskia Sassen argues in her recent book *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy* (2015), socio-economic systems today are imbued with a new political logic of rejection, heralding a new systematic phase of the neoliberal era. It may be hard to unambiguously identify the causes and protagonists – a combination of powerful actors, markets, technologies and governments – but the movement away from the social-democratic, Keynesian motivated political era seems to have become irrevocable. According to Sassen, we need to realise how systematically current economic thinking jeopardises our democratic space. If not, the risk is real that citizens will no longer be able to recognise the conditions needed for justice in our societal model. The language of politicians and opinion makers continues to lag alarmingly behind the brutality, speed and complexity with which economic forces are redistributing wealth in society. As we know from the past, this systematic economic and social disinvestment can result in the rise of fascism. This was also the point of Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis during the political impasse in the negotiations between Greece and the so-called Troika of creditors (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF).⁴ For these reasons, today we need to openly discuss

and reconsider the conditions for justice, inclusion and democracy. For conceptual inspiration, I propose translating Aeschylus' tragedy cycle *Oresteia* (458 B.C.) into the present, and situating it in contemporary Greece and Europe. With its special focus in the final part on the transformation of the Furies – the goddesses of vengeance – into the Eumenides – the 'kindly ones' who bring justice to the polis, the *Oresteia* is an archetypal story about the emergence of a society based on reason, order and civic responsibility. What can we learn from the *Oresteia*?

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The public is a practical realm in society, where words and deeds seek a public space (*agora*) in order to engage in a rhetorical/political struggle with and among one another (*demos*). The main feature of the public *demos* is that each participant, community or affiliation feels *strange*, and therefore *equal* in relation to that which is public. As a result of the hegemony of communal thinking and the financial abstractions that maintain inequality, the public sphere and its ideal organisation nevertheless remain limited, relative, and in fact in a state of constant *crisis*. The public sphere is never free nor guaranteed, but always subject to a lived power play and continuous division (*stasis*) in relation to the polis, i.e., the state or communal governance.

At the same time, the ideology of the polis is not consistent with the premise that 'ordinary people' and their inviolable conditionality and self-determination can be irrevocably ignored or destroyed. It is Greek tragedy that dramatises this continuous tension between the political order and community of citizens. In this theatrical form, political infighting finds a representation that stages the divisions between the political sphere and the other spheres of society (the civil and the sovereignty that propagates it). These are traditional tensions that must be suppressed or controlled under the spectre of a possible death of the polis at the hands of political power (the superego of social life). In short, with a privileged source and a reservoir of figures, Greek tragedy gives shape to what the political consensus must continually ignore: the permanent crisis between the political sphere and intimate, sovereign life.⁵

During its heyday in the fifth century B.C., Greek tragedy had an important social function due to the central place it occupied in the polis. The theatre genre was established by the city-state, in the same urban space and with the same institutional norms as the popular assemblies and the courts. It took the form of a spectacle that was open to citizens of all kind, albeit appointed by representatives of the various tribal communities. Societal representation was assured by the theatrical and public organisational form. Anchored in the contemporary perspective of the citizen of the polis, the ancient Greek heroic legends and myths were redirected to the tensions that lived in the present. Greek tragedy showed how the horror and

danger of the unrest, intrigues and atrocities that resulted from the *stasis* were the material *for* society. The tragedy localised the mystery, and gave form to that which was haunting society. While the main political function of the tragedy was to ritualise the mystery in the context of the polis, the tragic consciousness was never focused on satisfying answers or consensus: the incompatibility of the theatrical tension which it staged – between the ancient mythology and the modern polis – belonged to the crux of its social function.⁶

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In Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, the tragic motif is introduced with the murder of Orestes' father, Agamemnon, by his mother, Clytemnestra, and her lover, Aegisthos. Once he learns this, Orestes is forced to murder his mother and he becomes embroiled in a maelstrom of revenge and retaliation. This is the repetitive *chronotope*, i.e. unit of time and space, in which each murder would be punished with another murder, as articulated by the choir.⁷ This ceaseless cycle of horror is controlled by the blood debt. After the murder of his mother, the fear-stricken Orestes flees for the Furies, who inflame this dystopian chronotope of vendetta. Orestes finally comes under the protection of Athena and asks her to adjudicate, which leads Athena to set up the first public people's court in the *polis*. And thus is the vicious circle of violence broken: Orestes is acquitted and the Furies are admitted to the polis: in the political space of the modern city-state, they – like the Eumenides – become the "kindly ones", the new guardians of justice.

Aeschylus' *Oresteia* can be read as an allegory about the transition from a circular and archaic chronotope to a linear and modern temporality. In the study *Cosmology and the Polis* (2012), Richard Seaford shows how the introduction of the currency system in the Greek city-state had a major impact on the societal model.⁸ In particular according to Seaford, the *Oresteia* – using the cycle of infinite vendetta – dramatises the tensions that the 'monetary culture of the unlimited' introduced into society, a culture that in principle is 'incompatible with the social space and the democratic basis of the polis'.⁹ Seaford argues that the principles of balance and reciprocity in the political space of the Greek city-state were maintained by a cosmology formed by the principle of the immeasurable, the *apeiron*. This according to Seaford had been contaminated by the abstraction that financial thinking brought about in society. This financial abstraction dissolved the internal limits and contradictions in time and space, and paved the way for an impersonal homogeneity.¹⁰ Thus, the horrific cycle of blood feuds in the *Oresteia*, in which any chance of ritual *closure* in the community is excluded, allegorises the new reality of the rampant accumulation of money.¹¹

The adjudication of Orestes finally abolishes this *monetised chronotope*. The public tribunal installed by Athena anchors and ritualises justice in the polis. The Furies exchange their logic of reciprocity, originally founded negatively (revenge/ financial limitlessness) for a positive reciprocity assured by the social organisation in the political space (where they 'can exchange joy' and 'can provide for songs').¹² This metamorphosis does not exclude future tensions and violence in the polis – there is no synthesis – but, more importantly, reciprocity is now localised in the political space of the city-state through ritual and liturgy. Reason, progress and history, which are then elaborated from within the polis, are now embedded in an *etiological* chronotope that via the ceremonial practice of the Eumenides cult makes the political space and order of the polis the beginning and end of all public words and deeds.¹³

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An attempt to update the *Oresteia* was also undertaken in the early seventies by Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922-1975). He transferred the story to the contemporary African continent, which at that time was in the process of political and constitutional transition due to decolonisation. *Appunti per un'Orestide Africana* (1970) is a *postponed* film – a documentary that brings together theoretical and visual notes as a proposal for a film, but because this film was never made, was eventually released as a stand-alone *notes film*. In this notes film, Pasolini starts from the hypothesis that the processes of political transformation on the African continent make possible a new synthesis between the political order and archaic, sovereign life: an integration of 'old Africa' and 'modern, independent and free Africa'.¹⁴

Pasolini's engagement with Aeschylus began in 1959, when he was asked to translate *Oresteia* from Ancient Greek for a theatre production in Syracuse. In 1966, he then began writing the play *Pilade*, a sequel to the Aeschylus' trilogy. *Appunti per un'Orestide Africana* was filmed and edited between 1968 and 1970, was first shown in 1973, but only released in 1975, after Pasolini's death. In this notes film, he brings together very diverse types of material: documentary footage gathered in Tanzania and Uganda (commented by Pasolini's voice-over); archival material of the Biafran War (compared by Pasolini to the Trojan War); an interview with a group of African students at the University of Rome about the ideas and the material of his film (which functions as a *mise en abyme* in the film); a jazz session in a studio in Rome with two African-American singers who replay the scene of Cassandra's dream from *Agamemnon*.¹⁵

Just as in *Pilade*, Pasolini finally returns to presenting a synthesis between the polis and the sovereign life. He then at different moments in the film calls into question his announced starting point. Finally, at the end of the film, he argues for the impossibility of a final conclusion.

In the final scene, Pasolini acknowledges the archaic, fundamental and unstoppable power of the people who work and develop the land daily. In footage of a number of agricultural workers in the savanna accompanied by a marching song from the early Russian Revolution, Pasolini's voice-over examines the 'inner life' and the 'deep soul', albeit in the form of 'a fever of great patience'.¹⁶ In this scene, Pasolini sketches the African citizen as a partisan who embodies a mythical slowness that functions as an *under-determining* force in society. Earlier in the film, a number of scenes show us how this *forza del passato* is already in evidence on the surface: such as during the socio-political question and answer session he conducts with the African students at the test screening of the collected film material, or in his exploration of free jazz as soundtrack for the film. This conditional 'African soul', uncontrollable, and without clear contours – as if *without qualities* – ultimately never becomes more specific than *that which is beyond Europe* or *that which is different than Europe*. It appears as a timeless force in the present, which at the same time seems to go against this present, as if it will never be a part of it.¹⁷

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Early in his work, and with important similarities with his (later) analysis of Pasolini's St. Paul in *Appunti per un film su san Paolo (1968-1975)*, Alain Badiou discusses Aeschylus' *Oresteia* (in a comparison with Sophocles' *Antigone* (441 B.C.)) in order to develop his theory of the subject.¹⁸ Badiou describes, on the basis of the role and the position of Orestes, the link between *justice* and the (radically) *new* in the *Oresteia*. In the final scene, the Furies, from the moment that they transform into the Eumenedes, join and replace the two central characters: Orestes, who initially lends his name to fear, and finally exchanges it for courage; and Athens, who embodies justice.

It is the courage of Orestes that breaks the endless maelstrom of blood guilt: he stands up and demands a discussion based on the facts, thus initiating his own public trial. Although torn by fear, or rather, precisely because he is devoured by fear, he chooses not to join the tyranny of the blood debt and its boundless culture, nor to lose himself in blind, misguided opposition. Orestes stands his ground and resists the temptations of the Furies. Here fear and courage are closely connected because we see how both are (opposite) reactions that lead back to the same failure or break. How do we relate to an absolute break in the (symbolic) order? Do we demand redress, or do we pick up the pieces and try to think about order in a new way? Orestes inverts the radical absence of any certainty into its strength.¹⁹

The role of Athena in relation to the *stasis* is also special. At the moment that the cyclical web of obsession (the Furies) is interrupted, Athena must use great caution to survive the rebellion and confrontation unscathed. Her *justice* is located at the intersection of the exclusive

supremacy of the law and the self-determined, lawless life. The fact that the verdict of the trial jury was deadlocked regarding the issue of Orestes' guilt, thus resulting in an indecisive judgement, supports this parity between the lawless and the law. In short, it is Athena's regulation that institutionalises the legal principle of equality for the people's jury, based on which the dystopian chronotope of blood guilt is broken.

With the necessary intuition, Orestes counts on the fact that the lawless can control, overturn and reform the law, precisely because it is not written in the law – thus precisely because of its groundlessness. Athena's *ex-centric* decision, in which she installs a public people's court for the first time in the history of the polis, is not a repressive reaction, but a reform of the legal system, driven by an eruption of lawlessness – through the actions of Orestes who, with his decision, radically separates himself from the tyrannical maelstrom. The fact that Orestes risks (legal and social) rejection without the chance of return – the loss of his name and identity, permanent exile – is the core of his decision, which cannot be traced back to existing, traditional principles. 'Even though we have to return – and it is this return that makes the subject – there can arise an enlightened overcoming of what no longer entails any return.'²⁰

Last July Badiou wrote in *Libération* that the 'Oxi' – 'No' – result of the referendum on Greece's negotiations with the Troika can only have real force if it lives further and is broadly supported by strong and independent civil movements, regardless of the further course of the negotiations. The civic movements and the *grassroots* organisations have an obligation to continuously monitor government decisions and measures until the day that the danger has subsided that the collectively shared 'No' would be exchanged for realpolitik on the part of the Greek political establishment or destructive nihilism on the part of citizens.²¹

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In an extensive 1990 interview with her publisher, Sylvère Lotringer, American writer Kathy Acker (1947-1997) describes what she understands by *deconstruction*.²² She sees it as an activity in which she collects other texts and brings these together in new contexts to see how that works: 'You take texts apart and look at the language that's being used, the genre, the kind of sentence structure, there's a lot of contents here that most readers don't see.'²³ But what Acker calls deconstruction is not a form of tearing down, or resistance to a canon, or whatever: '[...] you don't need deconstruction anymore. (laughs) You know the whole thing's hell anyway.'²⁴ Acker is convinced that 'deconstruction is always a reaction', while she is looking precisely for something that is not a reaction. 'Deconstruction is always a reactive thing and as long you're dwelling in the reactive you're really reinforcing the society that you hate.'²⁵

In her literary work, which consists of short stories, plays and essays, Kathy Acker usually speaks with a voice that seems detached from the reality – from *every* reality, except her own – of the *text*. The characters through whom this voice speaks are hard to fathom figures with fluid identities and genders. They are fictional characters that have no sense of a superego or ownership and who categorically refuse to claim value for their individual *performance*.²⁶ We can draw a parallel between Acker's characters and Pasolini's St Paul, who is transferred to 20th century Europe in the script *Appunti per un film su san Paolo*. In both cases, nothing is spoken nor is action taken against the law or against order: a different kind of attitude lurks. St. Paul chooses the exact words that seem irrelevant or stupid at first sight according to Judaism or in the context of the pagan culture, but that still manage to disrupt the (symbolic) order. In the same way, the universal appeal of Acker's voice is linked to something that seems excessive, that refuses any predictable content and that no longer has any positive, concrete and measurable content. The universal nature of the words and deeds of Pasolini's Saint Paul and Acker's characters has a radically *generic* form that is outside the law and outside the traditional classification of good and evil.

Acker uses dissociation as method in her writing process, which yields *spliterature*: literature that transcends all boundaries.²⁷ The only *under-determinitive reality* that Acker takes account of is the reality of the *text*. And because 'text' is everywhere, plagiarism and appropriation are the rule. For Acker, the ontological basis for the text is like that of an *anagram* for a word: a text can be continually rearranged; meanings can turn against themselves, or divide up themselves without beginning or end. As with Pasolini's St Paul's, Acker's *mimetic* power is an important tool. St. Paul adapts strictly to each situation – he speaks like a Jew among the Jews, like a Gentile among the Gentiles. He transcends all differences by adapting his mimetism to each audience. He integrates himself into the specifics of the situation in which he preaches, but acts as if these differences do not exist; in this way he systematically unfolds his universal message.²⁸ A central identity is also absent in Acker's stories: 'I was splitting the I into false and true I's and I just wanted to see if this false I was more or less real than the true I; what are the reality levels between false and true and how it worked. And of course there's no difference.'²⁹

Acker sees *Empire of the Senseless*, from 1988, as a turning point in her writing.³⁰ In this book she abandons the explicit plagiarism and appropriation of existing texts and books, and begins to take Greek mythology as a guide for her method and process. Or, as she explains in her interview with Lotringer: 'My world isn't about ownership. In my world people don't even remember their names, they aren't sure of their sexuality, they aren't sure if they can define their genders. That's the way you feel in the mythical stories. You don't know quite why they act

the way they act, and they don't care. ...The reader doesn't own the character. There's a lot of power in the narrative, but not in story.'³¹ In the short story "Lust", also from 1988, which reads like a reprise of Jean Genet's *Querelle de Brest* (1947), Acker identifies the writer as a *sailor*: "Because he's alone, a sailor's always telling himself who he is."³² Just as Acker can always reinvent herself as writer. But the figure of the sailor and his endless wandering in particular give a new and positive meaning to the motif of *narrative*: 'I always wanted to be a sailor, that's really something that I love. ... I guess I just want to go on a trip, and thus I start a sentence and then the language changes and reverses it, and you don't even remember where you've been, you're always confronted with the present. You're always on the go, you always end up somewhere.'³³ The figure of the sailor has no identity (because he is alone) and only knows movements. It is also an ambiguous, grieving figure, engulfed by the lust to kill and by the intrigues with which he hopes to absolve himself. In short, it's an extremely precarious figure: "Abandoned by parents, by friends, by America, by the pricks I had sucked, I knew that above all I hated, not death, but giving up to death."³⁴

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What happens when we consider the voice and the figures of Kathy Acker from a tragic perspective? That is, what if we consider it a *political form of speaking*, i.e. in relation to the polis? Acker speaks in a voice that allows itself to become embedded in a myth with extensive, almost universal human value.³⁵ But how does her sovereign speech relate to the polis?

The cosmic order of the *Oresteia* – under the spell of the Furies – is initially driven by a systematic, monetised chronotope that abstracts and homogenises all difference: the discord in society is neutralised and oppressed by a logic of *impersonal necessity*. According to Seaford, the principle of the boundless that governs and legitimises the cosmic order of the Greek polis, the *apeiron*, was contaminated by the monetary culture that was introduced into Greek society at that moment. The societal principle that everyone is equal takes on a radically different embedding only after Orestes' resistance and trial: equality between individuals and communities becomes rooted in the social organisational form of political space, the representative function of which is guaranteed by means of ritualised practice. In other words, this new cosmic order finds its *apeiron* in a principle of equal reciprocity, guaranteed by its own social organisational forms and practice. The orientation of this *apeiron* is not totalitarian like it was under the Furies, but under the Eumenides is *generic*: the social organisational form focuses on finding the *shared material* that transcends the different individuals and parties. In this way, the need for the impersonal is exchanged for the choice for the generic.

Acker's voice has such a generic orientation. Her voice is detached from reality and functions according to its own premises. Although she has a personal desire with respect to this reality, it is never demonstrably disclosed. The motifs pile up, without apparent reason or unambiguous area of interest: 'Heart upon heart sits tattooed on every sailor's ass.'³⁶ We must recognise the fact that Acker performs no measurable deconstruction on reality as a courageous choice that is of the same order as that which Badiou discerns in Orestes. Her voice and method propose a generic reciprocity between intimate, sovereign life and the polis that is anchored in what they both share as real and material. At the point where they, in practice, are one. It ultimately expresses an intuition for a *generic chronotope*, which is also able to enclose and reform the *apeiron* of the cosmic order outside fiction and beyond the text.

¹ Adam Curtis, *Bitter Lake* (2015, 137')

² Jacques Derrida/François Laruelle, "Controverse sur la possibilité d'une science de la philosophie" in *La Decision Philosophique* 5 (1988), pp. 62–76; "Controversy over the Possibility of a Science of Philosophy" translated by Ray Brassier in *Organisation Non-philosophique Interantionale* (ONPhI); <http://www.onphi.net/texte-controversy-over-the-possibility-of-a-science-of-philosophy-37.html>

³ Saskia Sassen, *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy*, (Cambridge – London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015) pp. 213-217

⁴ Also see: <https://varoufakis.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/a-modest-proposal-for-resolving-the-eurozone-crisis-version-4-0-final1.pdf>

⁵ Alberto Toscano, "Taming the Furies: Badiou and Hegel on *The Eumenides*" in: Jim Vernon, Antonio Calgano (ed.), *Badiou and Hegel: Infinity, Dialectics and Subjectivity* (Lanham: Lexington books, 2015) pp. 193-206

⁶ Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy" in: Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York: Zone Books, 1990) pp. 29-48; Bernhard Gross, "Reconciliation and Stark Incompatibility. Pasolini's 'Africa' and Greek Tragedy" in: Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gragnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, *The scandal of self-contradiction. Pasolini's multistable subjectivities, geographies, traditions* (Vienna-Berlin: Turia + Kant, 2012) pp. 167-186, here: p. 175

⁷ Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in: *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 84-258

⁸ Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis, The Social Construction of Space and Time in the Tragedies of Aeschylus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

⁹ Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis*, p. 12

¹⁰ Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis*, pp. 69-70

¹¹ Vendetta in fact was rare in ancient Greek society; these were power and financial conflicts that led to revenge killings.

¹² Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis*, p. 219

¹³ Richard Seaford, *Cosmology and the Polis*, p. 219

¹⁴ Manuele Gagnolati, "Analogy and difference. Multistable Figures in Pasolini's *Appunti per un'Orestiade Africana*" in: Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gagnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, *The scandal of self-contradiction*, pp. 119-133, here: p. 122

¹⁵ Christoph F.E. Holzhey, "La Vera Diversità. Multistability, Circularity, and Abjection in Pasolini's *Pilade*", in: Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gagnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, *The Scandal of Self-Contradiction*, pp. 19-35; Manuele Gagnolati, "Analogy and Difference" in: Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gagnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, *The scandal of self-contradiction*, p. 121

¹⁶ Pier Paolo Pasolini, *Appunti per un'Orestiade Africana* (1975, 65')

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tjcx8Mhtoxc>) [my translation]: "But how to decide? There is no final conclusion; it must be postponed. A nation is born. The problems are endless. The problems are not solved; on the contrary, they live on. Life is slow. However, the march into the future is unstoppable. The work of the people knows no rhetoric nor delay. Their future is driven by the fever of the future. Their fever is great patience."

¹⁷ Also see: Bruno Besana, "Alain Badiou's Pasolini. The Problem of Subtractive Universalism" in: Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gagnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, *The scandal of self-contradiction*, pp. 209-236

¹⁸ Alain Badiou, "Theory of the subject according to Sophocles, theory of the subject according to Aeschylus" in: *Theory of the Subject*, trans. Bruno Bosteels (London-New York: Continuum, 2009) pp. 158-168; Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul. The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Pier Paolo Pasolini, "Appunti per un film su san Paolo", in Walter Siti

and Franco Zabaglio, *Per il cinema*, 2 vols (Milan: Mondadori, 2001), ii, pp. 1881–2020; Pier Paolo Pasolini, *Progetto per un film su san Paolo* in: *Per il cinema*, ii, pp. 2023–30; Pier Paolo Pasolini, *St Paul. A Screenplay*, trans. Elizabeth A. Castelli (London-New York: Verso Books, 2014).

¹⁹ Alain Badiou, "Theory of the subject according to Sophocles, theory of the subject according to Aeschylus", p. 160.

²⁰ Alain Badiou, "Theory of the subject according to Sophocles, theory of the subject according to Aeschylus", p. 168

²¹ http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2015/07/08/onze-notes-inspirees-de-la-situation-grecque_1345294; <http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2111-alain-badiou-eleven-points-inspired-by-the-situation-in-greece>

²² Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", in: *Hannibal Lecter, My Father*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 1–24

²³ Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", p. 14

²⁴ Sylvère Lotringer Papers and Semiotext(e) Archive, MSS 221, Series III: *Manuscripts from the Semiotext(e) Archive*, Box: 22 Folder: 53 (Kathy Acker, Interview with Sylvère Lotringer, 1990) [with thanks to Toni Hildebrandt]

²⁵ Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", p. 17

²⁶ Also see: François Laruelle, "Foreword: Gender Fiction" in: Katerina Kolozova, *Cut of the Real. Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014) pp. ix-xvi

²⁷ Avital Ronell, 'Kathy Goes to Hell: On the Irresolvable Stupidity of Acker's Death', in: Scholder, Amy, Carla Harryman and Avital Ronell (eds), *Lust for Life*, Verso, p. 16

²⁸ Bruno Besana, "Alain Badiou's Pasolini. The Problem of Subtractive Universalism", p. 215

²⁹ Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", p. 7

³⁰ Kathy Acker, *Empire of the Senseless* (New York: Grove Press, 1994)

³¹ Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", p. 23

³² Kathy Acker, "Lust", in: *Hannibal Lecter, My Father*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), p. 51

³³ Kathy Acker, "Devoured by Myths: An Interview with Sylvère Lotringer", p. 23

³⁴ Kathy Acker, "Lust", p. 59

³⁵ Alain Badiou, "Theory of the subject according to Sophocles, theory of the subject according to Aeschylus", p. 158

³⁶ Kathy Acker, *Empire of the Senseless*, p. 114